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Abstract:
Differences between women and men in perceptions of security threats 
are firmly established in public opinion research, with the “male warrior” 
and the “worried woman” two well documented stereotypes. Yet, we 
argue in this paper, the differences are not as well understood as such 
labels, or the search for explanations, imply. One reason for this is the 
lack of dialogue between public opinion research and feminist security 
studies. In bringing the two fields into conversation in analyzing mixed 
methods research data gathered in Britain, we suggest that while the 
extent of the gender gap in opinions of security is overstated, the gaps 
that do exist are more complex than previously allowed: men and 
women define “security” in slightly different ways; women tend to 
identify more security threats than men not necessarily because they 
feel more threatened but due to a greater capacity to consider security 
from perspectives beyond their own; women are more confident about 
government’s ability to deal with security threats in the future but not 
simply because of greater faith in government than men. This complexity 
implies a need to revisit assumptions, methods and analytical 
approaches in order to develop the field of gender and security further. 
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Anonymised interview transcripts from focus group participants, who consented to data 
sharing, the survey data, plus additional supporting information are available from the UK 
Data Service, subject to registration, at: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-851004.
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Public opinion research has found that gender differences on security issues of war, peace, 
and the use of military force are “a pattern found throughout the Western world.”1 This 
research suggests that, while women perceive more risks and threats to security then men2, 
“the largest and most consistent policy gender gap in public opinion polling” is that women 
are also less likely to support aggressive action to alleviate those risks and threats.3,4 
Notwithstanding the consistency of this finding over decades of research, we are told that 
“the underlying mechanisms driving it are only modestly understood”.5 
Searching for “underlying mechanisms” implies, however, that we understand the 
gaps we are trying to explain in the first place. This article will argue that the quest for such 
mechanisms is premature because the meaning of what these differences in perceptions 
between men and women represent is at best modestly understood. Moreover, we argue that 
the lack of dialogue between two key bodies of scholarship—public opinion research and 
feminist security studies (FSS)—has led to research designs and analyses that are framed in 
ways which limit our ability to understand them. 
1 Ulf Bjereld, ‘Children and the gender gap in foreign policy issues’, Gender and Society 15:2 
(2003), p.303.
2 Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, ‘Threat, anxiety, and 
support of antiterrorism policies’, American Journal of Political Science 49:3 (2005); Ashley 
Marie Nellis, ‘Gender differences in fear of terrorism’, Journal of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice 25:3 (2009); Christopher Salvatore and Brian Gorman, ‘Gender-based perceptions of 
the 2001 anthrax attacks: implications for outreach and preparedness’, Security Journal 27:4 
(2014); Pamela Wilcox, M. Murat Ozer, Murat Gunbeyi, and Tarkan Gundogd, ‘Gender and 
fear of terrorism in Turkey’, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 25:3 (2009).
3 Deborah Jordan Brooks and Benjamin Valentino, ‘A war of one’s own: understanding the 
gender gap in support for war’, Public Opinion Quarterly 75:2 (2011), p.270.
4 Sapiro prefers “gender differences” to “gender gap”, both because there is substantial 
overlap in men’s and women’s opinions and because differences in opinion between other 
groups are not referred to as “gaps” (see Virginia Sapiro, ‘Theorizing gender in political 
psychology research’, in David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robers Jervis (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)).The authors 
cited above do not always address their definition of gender. Hudson’s (2005, 156) 
description of “gender as unit of analysis is viewed as socially learned behaviour and 
expectations that distinguish between masculinity and femininity” appears to capture what is 
meant (Heidi Hudson, ‘“Doing” security as though humans matter: a feminist perspective on 
gender and the politics of human security’, Security Dialogue 36: 2 (2005), p.156.
5 Reed Wood and Mark Ramirez, ‘Exploring the microfoundations of the gender equality 
peace hypothesis’, International Studies Review, 20:3 (2018), p.350.
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In the twist on the feminist maxim “the personal is political”, Enloe reminds us that 
“the personal is international.”6 Indeed, research has shown that gendered perceptions at the 
individual level have consequences for the security and aggression of states, including for 
variation in leaders’ proclivity towards aggressive action.7 Hudson et al. argue further that 
whether or not women feel safe, not just their embrace of nonviolence, is an indicator of 
whether states are likely to engage in conflict: "If the women and peace thesis … is valid, the 
proposition follows that measures of women’s physical security should be strongly associated 
with measures of state security" (32).8 
We offer new understandings about the ways men and women perceive security 
threats and support aggressive action in response by bringing together key insights from 
feminist security studies and public opinion research. Though concerned with similar 
empirical topics, these bodies of scholarship have different epistemological starting points, 
adopt different analytical approaches and tend to use different methods. Broadly, public 
opinion has typically analyzed large-N quantitative data with the aim of estimating and 
explaining differences in threat perceptions between men and women.9 By contrast, FSS has 
typically analyzed small-N qualitative data about security discourses, demonstrating that they 
are reflective of gendered and racialized power relations—in terms of which issues count as 
matters of security, whose security concerns are heard, and the types of security knowledges 
which are privileged—and have material consequences for different groups in society.10 
6 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Base: Making Feminist Sense of International 
Politics, (London: University of California Press, 2000[1989], 2nd edition), p.196.
7 Valerie Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott and Chad 
Emmett, ‘The heart of the matter: the security of women and the security of states’, 
International Security, 33:3 (2008/9).
8 Hudson et al., ‘The heart of the matter’, p.32.
9 e.g., Brooks and Valentino, ‘A war of one’s own’; Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia 
Sapiro, ‘Gender, feminist consciousness, and war’, American Journal of Political Science, 
37:4 (1993).
10 e.g., Lene Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence of 
gender in the Copenhagen school’, Millennium, 29:2 (2000); Lene Hansen, ‘Are “core” 
feminist critiques of securitization theory racist? A reply to Alison Howell and Melanie 
Richter-Montpetit,’ Security Dialogue (published online 17 March, 2020); Jennifer K. Lobasz 
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Although both bodies of scholarship are well-established and command significant 
readership, our study is a timely intervention given that recently their methodological choices 
have been called into question. FSS has eschewed quantitative methods on the grounds of 
their associations with generalizability, representativeness and the production of “objective” 
knowledge11, embracing qualitative methods and the production of situated, reflexive 
knowledge about security instead. But this has also meant that FSS has been unable to 
examine how security discourses are understood and negotiated on a large-scale, nor to say 
much about the (un)certainty of postulated subgroup differences or about the effects of 
context. Indeed, Barkin and Sjoberg have called for greater engagement with quantitative 
methods,12 critiquing what they characterize as the misleading mapping of the 
quantitative/qualitative methods binary onto the positivist/post-positivist divide.13 At the 
same time, feminist scholars in public opinion research have argued that traditional methods 
adopted in their field have ignored contemporary feminist thinking on gender identity that, if 
incorporated into this research, would “contribute to alleviating gender normativity.”14 The 
public opinion literature on threat perception also tends to use narrow definitions of threat 
and Laura Sjoberg (eds.), Special issue on ‘The state of feminist security studies: a 
conversation’, Politics & Gender, 7:4 (2011); Laura Shepherd, ‘The state of feminist security 
studies: continuing the conversation’, International Studies Perspectives, 14:4 (2013).
11 Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (eds.), Feminist Methodologies for 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Ann Tickner, 
‘What is your research program? Some feminist answers to international relations 
methodological questions’, International Studies Quarterly, 49:1 (2005).
12 J. Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg, ‘Calculating critique: Thinking outside the methods 
matching game’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43:3 (2015), p.854; see also, 
Amalia Sa’ar, Dalia Sachs, and Sarai Aharoni, ‘Between a gender and a feminist analysis: 
The case of security studies in Israel’, International Sociology, 26:1 (2011).
13 See also, Daniel Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Everyday Security Threats: 
Perceptions, Experiences, and Consequences (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2017).
14 Amanda Bittner and Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, ‘Sex isn’t gender: reforming concepts and 
measurements in the study of public opinion." Political Behavior, 39:4 (2017), p.1026; see 
also, Sapiro, ‘Theorizing gender’; Katelyn Stauffer and Diana O’Brien, ‘Quantitative 
methods and feminist political science’, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2018); 
Sue Wilkinson, ‘Focus groups in feminist research: power, interaction, and the co-
construction of meaning’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 21:1 (1998).
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and security, missing an opportunity to engage with the problematization of these concepts 
within feminist security studies. 
We argue that a willingness to engage across epistemological divides—which 
demands methodological and analytical pluralism—and an acceptance of the “messy” 
findings this may produce, is necessary for a deeper understanding of gendered perceptions of 
security threats. This is a challenging task, not least because the vocabularies and concepts in 
these bodies of scholarship are used in different ways: even within FSS scholarship there are 
significant differences, for example between “standpoint” and “poststructural” feminists, in 
their understanding of gender and conceptualization of gendered differences, threats and 
security.15 Public opinion scholarship does not tend to explicitly theorize or engage with 
gender in the same way. In survey work, as in this paper, gender is often gauged by self-
reports of biological sex.16 Clearly, from a poststructural feminist perspective—which 
understands both sex and gender as performative (i.e., as discursively produced and having 
no “essential” character)—the use of these binary and heteronormative categories for data 
generation might be considered problematic.17 Yet, we would argue that these categories still 
have social meaning to people, that their everyday usage is politically important, and that 
understanding how this usage impacts experiences and perceptions of security threats 
demands precisely the sort of methodological compromise entailed by a pluralist approach.  
We are motivated in this article by two basic research questions. RQ1: To what extent 
are there differences in perceptions of security threats between men and women? RQ2: How 
should we characterize gender differences in perceptions of security threats and their 
implications? In bringing public opinion scholarship into closer conversation with FSS to 
15 Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: Issues, Debates, and Future Directions 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).
16 Bittner and Goodyear-Grant, ‘Sex isn’t gender’.
17 V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations 
Theory (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
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explore these questions, the primary aim is, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, to 
demonstrate how little we know about the nature of the “gender gap” in security opinion 
research. Our intention is not to synthesize them into a coherent approach and set of answers, 
but rather to embrace their tensions and contradictions—as well as areas of agreement—as a 
way of showing us the limitations of both. This goes beyond a premature search for 
explanations of a “gender gap”, leads us to ask different questions, and ultimately allows us 
to offer several paths for future research. To demonstrate the limits in our knowledge and to 
highlight the potential of a new approach, we share findings from the Security in an Age of 
Austerity project, conducted in Britain in 2012. 
While we demonstrate and scrutinize the kinds of differences in men’s and women’s 
perceptions that have characterized previous research, we emphasize how much overlap men 
and women have in opinions of security. Thus, in keeping with Sapiro18, we draw on original 
data to suggest that the “gender gap” is somewhat overstated. In addition, we argue that the 
differences that do exist are far more complex than previously allowed. This begins with men 
and women conceptualizing “security” in slightly different ways. We also suggest that, 
although women tend to identify more security threats than men, they feel less intensely 
about many of these threats than men (who tend to be on permanent “high alert”), and that 
this pattern is not necessarily because they feel more threatened but stems from a greater 
propensity to consider perceptions of security from perspectives beyond their own. Finally, 
we argue that women are more confident about government’s ability to deal with security 
threats in the future but that this also has complex roots that are not simply due to women 
having greater faith in government than men.
The article is divided into two main parts. The first is a brief discussion of the 
principal explanations for what is referred to as the “gender gap” in public opinion work on 
security, and a summary of the main FSS contributions to understanding of gender and 
18 Sapiro, ‘Theorizing gender’.
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security. This discussion identifies the core empirical, theoretical and methodological 
differences between these approaches. The second part explores what might be gained by 
bringing insights from both through an analysis of three findings from our research with 
respect to the two research questions. 
It is not our claim that these findings are generalizable in the sense that women’s and 
men’s experiences will be identical in other countries, or even that women and men would 
identify the same specific security threats in the same numbers in other years in Britain. We 
do contend, however, that just as the “gender gap” in perceptions of security has been 
replicated throughout the western world, the complexity that underlies the gender differences 
in opinion that we replicate is also likely in those different contexts. We also suspect that 
specific findings such as the gender differences we uncover in definitions of security threats 
would be seen outside Britain. More importantly, however, we contend that the need to bring 
public opinion and FSS research into more meaningful conversation is a general one. We 
conclude with a discussion of what the complexity we identify implies about the need to 
revisit and question assumptions, methods and analytical approaches in order to generate new 
knowledge that can develop the field of gender and security further. 
Gender Differences and Security Threats
Research on public opinion of security threats tells us that, although women and men 
do not inhabit different “political universes”19, women identify more threats while also being 
less likely than men to support aggressive action to address those threats.20 For example, 
women express more fear of the threat of a nuclear attack from a hostile state than men, but 
19 Conover and Sapiro, ‘Gender, feminist consciousness, and war’; Sapiro, ‘Theorizing 
gender’.
20 Huddy et al, ‘Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies’; Nellis, ‘Gender 
Differences in Fear of Terrorism’; Salvatore and Gorman, ‘Gender-based perceptions of the 
2001 anthrax attacks’; Wilcox et al., ‘Gender and Fear of Terrorism in Turkey.’
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are “more dovish” about nuclear weapons testing and weapons exports.21 Men are more likely 
to favour various uses of force, from the death penalty22 to tougher immigration policies23 
and military action.24 These differences appear to be consistent both cross-nationally and over 
time.25 
Theories about the origins of these differences in opinions about war and security 
have generally focused on why women are more peaceful (the “women and peace 
hypothesis”). Most of these theories can be grouped into explanations that focus on 1) social 
forces and gender roles, and 2) structural differences that lead to men being more aggressive 
and women more pacific. The first group of theories emphasize social learning and 
socialization: women’s subordinate role in society, lack of power and vulnerable position are 
cause and effect of day-to-day “gendered microaggressions”26 and “low level 
victimization.”27 These factors, coupled with men’s socialization into the more dominant role 
and suppression of expressions of fear28, result in differences in attitudes towards security and 
threats because, “Gender roles lead to highly differential possibilities for personal security, 
development, and prosperity, even in today’s world.”29 
21 Conover and Sapiro, ‘Gender, feminist consciousness, and war’; Miroslav Nincic and 
Donna Nincic, ‘Race, gender, and war’, Journal of Peace Research 39:5 (2002).
22 Stanley Feldman and Karen Stenner, ‘Perceived threat and authoritarianism’, Political 
Psychology, 18:4 (1997).
23 Henning Finseraas, Niklas Jakobbson and Andrea Kotsadam, ‘Did the murder of Theo van 
Gogh change Europeans’ immigration policy preferences?’, Kyklos, 64:3 (2011).
24 Huddy et al, ‘Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies.’
25 Johannes Bergh, ‘Explaining the gender gap: a cross‐national analysis of gender differences 
in voting.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 17:3 (2007); Richard 
Eichenberg, Gender, War, and World Order: A Study of Public Opinion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2019).
26 Valerie Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad Emmett, Sex and World 
Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
27 Elizabeth Gilchrist, Jon Bannister, Jason Ditton, and Stephen Farrall, ‘Women and the 
“fear of crime”: challenging the accepted stereotype’, British Journal of Criminology, 38:2 
(1998).
28 Hudson et al., ‘The heart of the matter’; Robbie M. Sutton and Stephen Farrall, ‘Gender, 
socially desirable responding and the fear of crime are women really more anxious about 
crime?’, British Journal of Criminology 45:2 (2005); Wood and Ramirez, ‘Exploring the 
microfoundations of the gender equality peace hypothesis’.
29 Hudson et al., ‘The heart of the matter’, p.20.
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The second group of theories rely on structural factors as explanations: because 
women tend to have fewer economic, social and political resources than men they “simply 
have more to lose from war or military violence.”30 Thus women’s greater opposition to war 
and conflict and fear of crime in particular is a consequence of their costs falling 
disproportionately on women, e.g., from sexual aggression31, and economically due to the 
feminization of poverty.32 Although such explanations suggest differences are based on 
realized experiences and rational-behavioural judgements, more than values or principles, the 
impact of these structural factors and their related experiences may lead to shifts in identity or 
role perceptions, linking back to the first group of theories. 
FSS scholarship approaches the analysis of gender and security differently and 
significantly complicates these explanations of the “gender gap” found in public opinion 
research. Beginning with the women and peace hypothesis, FSS scholarship encourages us to 
consider the alternative framing of the puzzle from the “woman question” to the “man 
question”, i.e., why men are more likely to favour aggressive responses to security threats 
instead of seeking to explain women’s deviation from the masculine norm.33 Feminist 
scholars have also sought to recognize women’s agency as violent actors, challenging the 
assumption that women are socialized to be peaceful, and drawing our attention to the ways 
in which discourses about (peaceful) women, including our research frameworks, are 
themselves gendered and reproduce the hierarchies they seek to explain.34 As Young argues, 
30 Bjereld, ‘Children and the gender gap’, p.304.
31 Megan Bastick, Karen Grimm, and Rachel Kunz, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: 
Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007); Huddy et al, ‘Threat, anxiety, and support of 
antiterrorism policies.’
32 Shahra Razavi, ‘Gendered poverty and well-being: an introduction,’ Development and 
Change 30:1 (1999).
33 Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), Rethinking the Man Question (London and 
New York: Zed Books, 2008).
34 Linda Ahall, ‘Motherhood, myth and gendered agency in political violence’, International 
Feminist Journal of Politics, 14:1 (2012); Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Beyond Mothers, 
Monsters, Whores: Thinking about Women’s Violence in Global Politics (Chicago: 
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“attempts to connect violence structures with attributes or behavioral propensities that men or 
women supposedly share … rely on unsupportable generalizations about men and women and 
often leap too quickly from an account of the traits of persons to institutional structures and 
collective action.”35 FSS research has also developed structural accounts significantly by 
exploring the ways in which women’s vulnerability and their behaviour are co-constitutive of 
gendered security practices, such as wartime sexual violence.36 Feminists have argued that 
gender is “both constitutive and causal” in global politics37 in that security discourses and 
practices reproduce gendered identities, as much as gender “causes” those different 
discourses and experiences of in/security. They have also shown that the politics of gender 
insecurity is not self-contained, but intersecting with, inter alia, nation, class, and race.38 
Finally, in empirical studies of gendered socialization, such as “militarized masculinity”, FSS 
scholars have shown that this socialization is more malleable, contradictory and unstable than 
earlier research assumed.39 
University of Chicago Press, 2015); Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, 
Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics. (London: Zed Books, 2007).
35 Iris Marion Young, ‘The logic of masculinist protection: reflections on the current security 
state’, Signs, 29:2 (2003), p.2.
36 Lene Hansen, ‘Gender, nation, rape: Bosnia and the construction of security’, International 
Feminist Journal of Politics, 3:1 (2001); K Lee Koo, ‘Confronting a disciplinary blindness: 
woman, war and rape in the politics of security’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 37:3 
(2002); Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
37 Laura Sjoberg, ‘Feminist security and security studies,’ in Alexandra Gheciu and William 
C. Wohlforth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Security (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), p.4.
38 Hansen, ‘Are “core” feminist critiques of securitization theory racist?’; Victoria Basham 
and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Gender, race, and border security practices: a profane reading 
of “muscular liberalism”’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15:4  
(2013).
39 Aaron Belkin, Bring Me Men: Military Masculinity and the Benign Facade of Empire 
1898-2001 (London: Hurst & Co, 2012); Sarah Bulmer and Maya Eichler, ‘Unmaking 
militarized masculinity: veterans and the project of military-to-civilian transition’, Critical 
Military Studies, 3:2 (2017); Claire Duncanson, ‘Hegemonic masculinity and the possibility 
of change in gender relations’, Men and Masculinities 18:2 (2015), 231-248; Paul Higate 
(ed), Military Masculinities: Identity and the State,  (Westport, CT and London: Praeger. 
2003).
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In this brief survey we have offered potential explanations of the causes of gender 
differences in public opinion research, and the core contributions of FSS scholarship, as well 
as showing some of the blind spots and misunderstandings that arise in answering the 
fundamental research questions we pose because of the lack of dialogue between public 
opinion and FSS research. Crucially, in public opinion work we lack a basic understanding of 
what gender differences in perceptions of security threats mean and which acknowledges that 
security discourses themselves are gendered. 
Given that this research is exploratory, our expectations are necessarily speculative 
with regard to what the contrasting methods and perspectives of public opinion and FSS 
research are likely to offer. They relate more to potential insights from the tensions we have 
indicated and their implications for the meaning of “gender differences” in perceptions of 
security threats. It is also possible, however, that in bringing the two approaches into 
conversation we will discover some areas in which their findings reinforce each other. 
Ultimately our main aim is to initiate a discussion and productively complicate existing 
understandings of the “gender gap” in public opinion research, rather than to test hypotheses, 
generate new theories, or offer comprehensive explanations. To address our two research 
questions, we seek to develop our understanding of three tensions and limitations in extant 
research.
i. Articulations of security threats
Recent qualitative40 and quantitative/mixed-method41 work indicates that there is systematic 
variation in how people articulate security threats. But much of the empirical research on 
RQ1, perceptions of security threats, does not go back to this most fundamental of 
differences42; it assumes that women and men give the same meaning to “security threat”, 
40 Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, ‘Vernacular securities and their study: a qualitative analysis 
and research agenda’, International Relations, 27:2 (2013).
41 Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, Everyday Security Threats.
42 e.g., Eichenberg, Gender, War, and World Order.
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while not necessarily identifying the same threats or sharing equal concern about them. FSS 
indicates that security discourses are “always already” gendered, thus it is important not only 
to understand how discourses of security determine gendered experiences of insecurity by 
constructing material realities but also how these discourses themselves privilege gendered 
values or norms. This means that what we consider “security” to be, and the measures we 
undertake to “secure” ourselves, are also gendered knowledge constructs. For example, 
Peterson43 analyzes the way in which the Bush administration launched the war on terror by 
constructing women and feminized others in ways that demanded masculinized identities and 
action. On the individual level it may be that men are less likely to express insecurities 
because of masculine norms.44 Finally, lived experience is complex and security has 
significant cognitive and affective dimensions which are challenging to represent. It is 
possible to think and feel both secure and insecure at the same time45, which may not always 
emerge from standard survey questions, or be misinterpreted as attitude inconsistency or 
“non-attitudes.” 
ii. Threats beyond conflict and the state
Research on public perceptions of security threats tends to be narrowly focused on threats 
pertaining to war and military conflict; yet everyday security threats are broader and may be 
more salient.46 Indeed, consistent with a general tendency towards higher perceptions of 
threat among women due to physical and resource vulnerability, extant studies suggest that 
gender differences extend to economic and job security, where women may both be more at 
43 V Spike Peterson, ‘Gendered identities, ideologies, and practices in the context of war and 
militarism’, In Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via (eds.), Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist 
Perspectives (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010), p.28.
44 Rachel Pain, ‘Place, social relations and the fear of crime: a review’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 24:3 (2000).
45 Laura Sjoberg, ‘Centering security studies around felt, gendered insecurities’, Journal of 
Global Security Studies, 1:1 (2016).
46 Caron Gentry, ‘Epistemological failures: everyday terrorism in the west’, Critical Studies 
on Terrorism, 8:3 (2015); Jarvis and Lister, ‘Vernacular securities and their study.’
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risk47 and have more limited choices than men48, although the gender gaps are smaller than 
for foreign policy issues.49 The Transatlantic Trends data used by Eichenberg demonstrate 
gender differences not only on military force and spending on defence but for an issue such 
as a possible avian flu pandemic, where the gender gaps in perceptions of threat are as large 
as for “the global economic downturn.”50 FSS scholarship has also identified that many 
insecurities women experience come from within, rather than outside of, the nation-state.51 
In order to understand variations in how and what people think about security issues 
that fully consider RQ1, a broader range of security threats than war and conflict therefore 
needs to be considered52 that goes beyond the nation and threats to the state.53 However, to 
address RQ2 it is also important to understand the processes through which particular 
vulnerabilities or fears become “securitized.” FSS scholars have shown that gendered norms 
(intersecting with class and race) shape what is considered to be a security issue—as  
opposed to a “domestic policy problem”, for example—and who has the social authority to  
“speak security.”54 Traditional security discourses around ideas of “national security” have 
excluded the “feminised” domestic realm and we need to pay as much attention to what is not 
considered a security threat by “studying silences.”55 We also need to gauge not simply the 
security threats that women and men identify but the intensity with which they are 
47 Genevieve LeBaron and Adrienne Roberts, ‘Toward a feminist political economy of 
capitalism and carcerality’, Signs, 36:1 (2010).
48 Sylvia Chant, ‘The “feminisation of poverty,” and the “feminisation” of anti-poverty 
programmes: room for revision?’ Journal of Development Studies, 44:2 (2008).
49 Bjereld, ‘Children and the gender gap’; Sapiro, ‘Theorizing gender.’
50 Eichenberg, Gender, War, and World Order.
51 Peterson (ed.), Gendered States.
52 Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson, ‘Mapping the contours of “everyday security”: 
time, space and emotion’, British Journal of Criminology, 56:6 (2016).
53 e.g., Karen Snedker, ‘Altruistic and vicarious fear of crime: fear for others and gendered 
social roles’, Sociological Forum, 21:2 (2006).
54 Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma’; Hansen, ‘Are “core” feminist 
critiques of securitization theory racist?’
55 Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma’; Annica Kronsell, ‘Method for 
studying silences: gender analysis in institutions of hegemonic masculinity,’ in Brooke 
Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (eds.), Feminist Methodologies for International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Page 14 of 39
Cambridge University Press
European Journal of International Security
For Peer Review
13
experienced, i.e., whether they are seen to represent acute danger demanding response or 
something less urgent. 
iii. Government’s ability to deal with security threats
It is well established in public opinion literature that women tend to perceive more threats 
than men and that women are also more “risk averse” than men.56 This framing has led to a 
focus on measuring support for aggressive interventions or on changes in the individual’s 
behaviour to mitigate risks such as terrorism57 in order to understand the apparent puzzle that 
women feel more threatened but are less willing to support aggressive responses.  
Existing work, which overwhelmingly focuses on support for military responses, 
limits understanding in two key ways: first, it marginalizes everyday security concerns; 
second, as a result, we do not know whether gender differences in support for government 
action either extend to other kinds of security threats, or derive from the threat itself or from a 
broader gendered scepticism about the ability of government to combat these threats. To 
understand more fully the meaning and consequences of threat perception, thus providing 
further evidence to address RQ2, demands exploration of how these perceptions translate to 
views of government and what government can do. Does risk aversion mean not just that 
women are less supportive of military intervention but that they are generally sceptical about 
the government’s ability to mitigate threats? Does men’s propensity for high risk responses, 
such as military action, suggest greater confidence in the efficacy of government actions?
Addressing these gaps in our knowledge would enable a greater understanding of 
what influences preferred responses to threats but also allow us to connect these experiences 
of threat and security with the feminist research about the gendered nature of the state and 
56 e.g., Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy, ‘Gender differences in preferences’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47:2 (2009).
57 e.g., Patricia Gwartney, ‘Race, gender, class and perceptions of terrorism in the immediate 
aftermath of September 11, 2001’, Race, Gender & Class, 14: (2007); Nellis, ‘Gender 
Differences in Fear of Terrorism.’
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government more generally.58 Previous research on these questions is divided and under-
theorized. On the one hand, greater risk aversion among women and women’s experience of 
threats on a daily basis, coupled with men’s perceptions of invulnerability, may lead us to 
expect women to be more sceptical than men about the government’s ability to deal with 
those threats. On the other hand women may be more apt to see the state as “the imagined 
provider of security”59 or as an extension of their caregiving role60, for example through 
austerity measures.61 Indeed, Salvatore and Gorman find that while women express greater 
fear of threats such as terrorism they also seem to be more positive about the government’s 
reactions to them.62 
Research Design: Combining Small Group Discussion with a Large-N Survey
In order to address these research problems, we need an approach that allows us to see 
how men and women articulate what they mean by and identify as “security threats”, that 
looks at those threats beyond war and military conflict at the national and international level, 
and that asks about government effectiveness in dealing with perceived threats.63 To 
58 Peterson (ed.), Gendered States; Young, ‘The logic of masculinist protection.’
59 Maud Eduards, ‘What does a bath towel have to do with security policy? Gender trouble in 
the Swedish armed forces’, in Anica Kronsell and Erica Svedberg (eds.), Making Gender, 
Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices (London: Routledge, 2011).
60 Salvatore and Gorman, ‘Gender-based perceptions of the 2001 anthrax attacks.’ This would 
itself need to be explained given the insecurities the state can inflict disproportionately on 
women.
61 Rosalind Cavaghan and Muireann O’Dwyer, 2018. ‘European economic governance in 
2017: a recovery for whom?’ Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review. 56.
62 See also, Gwartney, ‘Race, gender, class and perceptions of terrorism.’
63 Securitization theory has been critiqued for its prioritization of the speech acts of elite 
actors (Thierry Balzacq, Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve 
(London: Routledge, 2010)). It has also been criticized for ignoring “security as silence” 
(Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma’), for its silencing of the “subaltern” 
(Sarah Bertrand, ‘Can the subaltern securitize? Postcolonial perspectives on securitization 
theory and its critics’, European Journal of International Security, 3:3 (2018); Alison Howell 
and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, ‘Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, 
methodological whiteness, and Anti-black thought in the Copenhagen School’, Security 
Dialogue, 51:1 (2020)), and for the notion that security can be separated “from the workings 
of gender” (Maria Stern, and Annick Wibben, ‘A decade of feminist security studies 
revisited’, virtual collection for Security Dialogue (2015). Accessed 24 April 2018). While 
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accomplish this we analyze mixed methods data, integrating qualitative focus group and 
quantitative survey research data from Britain in order to examine the nature and implications 
of men’s and women’s perceptions of security and security threats.64 While both methods are 
often used in isolation, neither is sufficient for our purposes for two reasons. 
First, although qualitative research allows women and men to define and articulate 
“security threats” in their own words, and is often the preferred method of feminist IR 
scholars65, it does not permit estimation of the extent, size or uncertainty of those differences. 
Second, large-N survey research enables more precise estimation of gender differences but 
does not on its own permit the richer examination and explanation underlying those 
differences that we seek. We use data from these two different methods to address the gaps 
and tensions in each mode of analysis that would otherwise only allow a more limited 
exploration of the research puzzle.66 
The Security in an Age of Austerity project conducted 20 focus groups for 90 
minutes in two waves of ten. Their defining demographic for us is gender, but within 
gender groups also varied by religion67, lifestage, and region, both in order to enhance 
discussion of sometimes sensitive topics such as fear of knife crime or racism and to be 
sensitive to intersectional differences that might moderate gender differences, which we 
discuss below (see Online Appendix section A1 for the composition of groups). 
our approach relies on articulated understandings of security threats, e.g., in the survey, we 
observe gendered silences, for example in female subjects in the surveys and focus groups 
not identifying domestic violence as a salient security threat, and racialized experiences of 
insecurity among minority groups (see below).
64 A FSS perspective did not directly inform the research design. The engagement with FSS 
arose after we noticed interesting gender differences in our data.
65 Sa’ar et al., ‘Between a gender and a feminist analysis.’
66 For a fuller discussion of mixed methods research designs in public opinion and security 
studies research, see Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, Everyday Security Threats, Chapter 2.
67 Given the likely distinct experiences of religious minorities associated with particular 
ethnicities after 9/11 and 7/7, some groups were composed of Muslims or Hindus and Sikhs; 
this provided a glimpse into racialized experiences of insecurity, which requires further 
research.
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In the first wave of 10 groups men and women were allowed to define and 
identify the scope and nature of security threats. The findings of this first wave of focus 
group research were used to inform subsequent data collection and analysis, beginning 
with the development of a 25-minute survey of 2004 respondents that allowed further 
examination of the three research topics, including estimates of the uncertainty of 
relationships between variables. The sample was representative of the population in terms 
of sex, age, region, and vote in the previous UK general election (see Table A1 of the 
Online Appendix). Drawing on the focus groups, the survey asked about definitions of 
“security threat”, as well as about perceptions of a range of issues extending beyond war 
and conflict, as “serious threats” at the moment. It gauged opinion about these issues, 
first as threats to “the security of the world” and then to “the UK,” “the community in 
which you live,” and “you and your family”, allowing us to examine perceptions of 
threats beyond the state. The list of potential threats was constructed from a combination 
of those recognized in the UK government’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
threats that were frequently mentioned in discussion in the focus groups. They included 
terrorism and attacks on UK cyber space from the former, and the economy, immigration, 
burglary and online fraud from the latter. In addition, the survey asked about perceptions 
of the effectiveness of the British government’s approach to security in terms of its 
handling of a range of security issues now and in the future (see Online Appendix section 
A8 for exact question wordings). 
Finally, additional focus groups were conducted after the initial results of the 
quantitative research had been processed in order to tease out further meaning. The groups 
covered many of the same topics as the first wave but with a greater emphasis on 
understandings and perceptions of “security threat,” levels of security threats today compared 
to the past, and the extent to which responsibility to reduce threats falls on individuals rather 
than governments. 
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We analyze the survey data by looking mostly at the bivariate relationships between 
gender and perceptions of security threats but we control for other variables in multiple 
regression models where appropriate, e.g., where we seek to see whether gender differences 
are robust to the introduction of variables such as age. With regard to the qualitative data, two 
of the authors first reviewed all the transcripts. They then separately identified recurring ideas 
in the focus groups related to the three topics of: articulations of security threats, specific 
threats mentioned and discussed, and perceptions of government with respect to security 
threats. Where differences between women and men were evident, the authors organized 
them into themes (an idea could be in more than one theme) also identifying quotes that were 
illustrative of each theme—thus the quotes we use throughout the analysis are representative 
of the themes we found.68 The two authors then reconciled the themes present in the groups 
through discussion and further analysis. Stewart and Shamdasani term this method of analysis 
of focus groups “scissor-and-sort.”69 Th y suggest a weakness is that it often depends on a 
single analyst; in our case, we guarded against that by having two authors analyze the 
transcripts (see Online Appendix for further discussion). 
Analysis
i. Articulations of security threats
We use the quantitative and qualitative data to examine the fundamental FSS question 
of how men and women think and talk about what “security” and “security threat” means. In 
the survey, respondents were provided with ten descriptions of “security” and asked for up to 
68 The gender differences we identified from the focus group are tendencies rather than 
necessarily being characteristic of all individuals and all groups—any more than relationships 
present in survey data characterize all respondents in the survey. Quantitative survey research 
can, however, tell us about the statistical significance of relationships, while the tendencies 
we discuss from the qualitative data are those we regard as “significant” from our reading of 
them. Readers can examine the publicly available transcripts at 
https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/studies/study?id=851004.
69 David Stewart and Prem Shamdasani, Focus Groups: Theory and Practice (3rd edition, 
Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014), p.116.
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three that best captured their own definition. Drawing on previous research70, they covered a 
range of definitions, from security as the absence of threats at various levels to equality, 
physical safety, and freedom. 
Table 1 shows the proportions of men and women that selected each definition as the 
primary meaning of security for them, and that chose each as one of their top three criteria, 
under “Any Mentions.” It demonstrates that women and men tended to order these criteria in 
the same way, with physical safety being the most frequently chosen definition of security. 
But there were differences in the proportions selecting specific criteria. While some of these 
differences rise to statistical significance (in the shaded boxes in Table 1), the largest is 11 
percent. Consistent with the idea of “gendered microaggressions”71, women were more likely 
to define security in terms of physical safety and the absence of threats to humans in general, 
and, in line with the idea of financial hardship falling disproportionately on women72, were 
also somewhat more likely to mention access to resources such as “healthcare for human 
well-being.” Men were more likely than women to refer to the absence of threats “to me” and 
to freedom from foreign dictatorship and absence of threats to the community (although for 
both men and women the latter two were less common definitions). These findings may 
reflect previous research on crime that women and men focus on different objects of threat—
to children, partner, individual or country.73 We return to this difference in perspectives—
“humans in general” versus “my community” and “me”—later.
Table 1 about here
Differences were not evident, however, in the specific security threats that sprang to 
mind for men and women in the focus groups: even if women and men define security 
70 e.g., Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, ‘Disconnected citizenship? The impacts of anti-
terrorism policy on citizenship in the UK’, Political Studies, 61:3 (2013).
71 Valerie Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad Emmett, Sex and World 
Peace, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p.17.
72 Hudson et al., ‘The heart of the matter.’
73 Gilchrist et al., ‘Women and the “fear of crime”’; Snedker, ‘Altruistic and vicarious fear of 
crime.’
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somewhat differently they tended to identify the same issues as security threats. Both male 
and female focus group respondents seemed to connect the ideas of security and security 
threat primarily with crime and terrorism. While there was some variation, men and women 
tended to prioritize and categorize security threats in a broadly similar way. When asked what 
“came to mind” when they thought about the word security, Sue recognized that “all types of 
things” could be securitized or conceptualized as threats, before she and two women in her 
group identified “safety”, “security tags”, “bombs”, “burglaries”, and “breaking in. Stealing 
your car, taking something out of the car.” Among men, similar themes were in evidence 
when asked what came to mind when they thought of “security threats”: their responses 
included “burglary”, “theft”, “Al Qaeda”, “Iran”, “9/11” and “images of 7/7 bombings.”    
Looking more closely at how women and men talk about security threats and 
associated concepts such as risk, the qualitative evidence suggests men are more fearful than 
women when it comes to assessing the current threat level and in their general attitudes 
toward risks: women appear to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards threats. This challenges 
findings from previous research, based predominantly on survey data, that women feel more 
threatened (e.g., Nellis 2009; Wilcox et al. 2009).74 For example, here is an exchange about 
perceptions of threat levels among a group of middle aged Hindu women (reacting to a 
colour-coded “threatometer” to locate what they felt to be the current level of threat):
Sonia: I would say little risk.
Little risk, why do you say that?
Pam: Mine would be on the line, that line.
The line between little risk and risk.
Pam: Yes.
Okay. And where would you?
Pam: Because you are alert aren’t you.
Hitala: The same thing, on the same level, yes.
Okay. So why do you think little risk?
Pam: I don’t feel, although I am alert I don’t feel uneasy, I am not scared to go out the 
house or anything like that [laughter] I get on with my life without worrying, because 
some people won’t go out their door will they.
74 e.g., Nellis, ‘Gender differences in fear of terrorism’; Wilcox et al., ‘Gender and fear of 
terrorism in Turkey.’
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In another example, from a group of retired white women, the point about pragmatism is 
illustrated throughout but perhaps most clearly by the final comment:
Val: I don’t think there’s any point in being anxious about terrorism, to be honest. 
Because I can’t do anything. If my next-door neighbour’s making a bomb, there isn’t 
a great deal I can do …If you’re saying that there’s people on the streets that are 
going round planning to blow people up, then again, I can’t do anything so getting 
anxious about it, I don’t think, does me in.
Judy: The trouble with terrorism is that it's invisible isn’t it?  You could be stood next 
to a man at the bus, who could be a suicide bomber.
….
Judy: I think terrorism's something that ordinary people like us just can’t do anything 
about. The government can’t do anything about it even though they’re trying.
Contrast this with an exchange on the same theme among middle-aged white men, in 
which the sense of threat, unwillingness to countenance a level of “little threat,” and 
perceived need to be alert is palpable:
Mike: You’ve got to be responsive to everything … Everyone is uneasy about 
everything … that’s how I’d see it but all three of us might have a different idea. 
Richard: I would say it is between the two, I would say it is probably quite close to 
getting high risk. 
…
John: Certainly not either of the yellow ones is it, certainly not no risk or little risk. I 
think we’ve all got heightened awareness of what’s going on. 
Or among older white men with children:
Ian: I think it [the UK] is still at high risk personally.
...  And what is it that is telling you that we are at high risk or risk?
Neil: Well as Ian just said we've had the Olympics and the country was put on a high 
alert because we've got so many people coming into the country. It becomes attractive 
to some terrorists but some of the terrorists have got wise to that and the fact that you 
are thinking about it is enough for them because you are expending a lot of economic 
activity and dressing up a perception and that's what it’s there to do. It’s not 
necessarily to dismantle buildings and kill people. It’s about causing economic 
destruction.
In the following exchange among retired white men, after one respondent’s description of the 
current situation as “high risk”, we also see a wish for action that contrasts starkly with 
Judy’s sentiment that, “The government can’t do anything about it even though they’re 
trying”:
Would you two agree with that that it’s higher risk now?
Ralph: It is high risk yes, yes.
Alan: Yes.
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Ralph: And not only is it higher risk and it has been for a long time but something needs 
to be done about it nationally whereas nothing seems to be done at all, we don’t know 
what’s, you know nothing’s going on at the moment…
In sum, men and women in our study define “security” somewhat differently, with the 
survey evidence in Table 1 showing women more likely to define security in terms of 
physical safety, absence of threats to humans, and access to resources like education and 
health for human well-being, while men are more likely to see it as an absence of threats to 
them as individuals and to their community. These differences are statistically significant, 
while also indicating a degree of overlap that is consistent with previous research.75 However, 
when we examine articulations of security threats in the focus groups, contrary to the 
prevailing literature76 men appear to be more fearful than women, with women adopting a 
pragmatic response to security threats. This need not imply that women identify fewer threats 
than men—we will turn to that evidence shortly—but the women in our groups indicated 
lower levels of anxiety because there was little that they or the government could do, whereas 
the men spoke of high levels of risk and the need to be alert and ready to act. 
It is not clear why men feel more threaten d, and this is somewhat contrary to 
structural theories of the gender gap outlined above, which suggest men are less vulnerable to 
threats. As Peterson explains with regards to the war on terror, it may be that security threats 
are being constructed in ways which “demand masculinized identities and action.”77 The 
logic of masculinist protection analyzed by Young suggests that “the “good” man is one who 
keeps vigilant watch over the safety of his family and readily risks himself in the face of 
threats from the outside in order to protect the subordinate members of his household.”78 Or, 
it may be that risk, and risk taking, are associated with masculinity more generally.79 Without 
75 Sapiro, ‘Theorizing gender in political psychology research.’
76 e.g., Huddy et al, ‘Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies’; Wilcox et al., 
‘Gender and fear of terrorism in Turkey.’
77 Peterson, ‘Gendered identities, ideologies, and practices,’ p.28 (our emphasis).
78 Young, ‘The logic of masculinist protection,’ p.4.
79 Cynthia Enloe, Seriously!: Investigating Crashes and Crises as If Women Mattered, 
(London and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2013).
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further research, particularly on how gender intersects with race in public perceptions of 
threat, we cannot draw any definitive conclusions, but what this exploratory analysis of 
British data demonstrates is that using mixed methods and insights from FSS about the 
gendered nature of security discourses leads to a more complex and nuanced picture than 
traditional public opinion scholarship perspectives might allow. While men and women 
define security somewhat differently, inferences that we might draw from survey data alone 
could be misleading: by observing articulations of threat in addition, we show pragmatism 
among our female respondents that would otherwise be missed and that compels us to re-
interpret the survey data and to generate new lines of enquiry. 
ii. Threats beyond conflict and the state
Going beyond issues of war and military conflict and the confines of global and 
national threats, we now use the quantitative data to compare the number of threats that 
respondents viewed as global, national, community and personal in response to separate 
questions about which issues they “consider to be serious threats to the security of” the world, 
the UK, “the community in which you live”, and “you and your family” (for a full list of the 
issues see Online Appendix section A8). Their responses show that women and men 
generally identified the most security threats on average at the global level—between 6 and 
7—followed by the national level, with fewest threats—about 2—identified as community or 
personal (see Online Appendix Table A2). In keeping with the implications of previous 
research, but in contrast to the more pragmatic attitudes toward risk and threat that we 
discussed in the previous section, women tended to perceive more threats at all levels, 
although the differences are statistically significant only for perceptions of the number of 
global threats. We see no sign either that threats at the local level are more salient for women, 
i.e., that any greater concern about everyday security threats80 is at that level, or that the 
80 Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World (London: Transaction Books, 1984); 
Rachel Pain, Everyday Terrorism: How Fear Works in Domestic Abuse (Centre for Social 
Justice, Durham University, 2012).
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slightly higher likelihood of men to include an absence of threats to the community in their 
definition of security shown in Table 1 results in the identification of a greater number of 
community level threats.
Table 2 focuses on differences in the specific threats identified by men and women 
from the survey data (see Online Appendix Table A3 for the full table). It confirms that 
women and men do not inhabit vastly different universes in their perceptions of salient 
threats.81 Their answers indicate both that they rank security threats in a similar order and 
also that there are not issues for which a majority of women are on one side and men on 
another; indeed, the largest differences were 14 percent and most were smaller, which is 
similar to the findings of previous research on threats pertaining to war and military 
intervention.82
Table 2 also shows that the issues women perceive as security threats range well 
beyond those pertaining to war and military intervention—indeed, while there was a 
difference in the perceived threat from terrorism there was none on issues such as the threat 
of an international military crisis between states or nuclear weapons programmes in hostile 
states—tending to fall under the banners of crimes of various kinds, the economy, and 
environmental issues including the possibility of nuclear accidents. Some of these are 
consistent both with theories that women are more threatened than men by issues linked to 
the possibility of physical harm83, and with our evidence showing the greater likelihood of 
women to define security in terms of resources for human well-being, e.g., fear of online 
fraud and identity theft, or “threats to humans in a general sense”, e.g., greater sensitivity to 
environmental issues and nuclear accidents. But the gender differences we found in 
definitions of “security” cannot fully explain the results. 
81 Conover and Sapiro, ‘Gender, feminist consciousness, and war.’
82 e.g., Eichenberg, Gender, War, and World Order.
83 Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace.
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At the national level also, Table 2 shows that there are more issues for which 
women’s perceptions of threat were significantly greater than men’s—five, compared to one 
for which men were more threatened than women—but on most of the 22 issues, including 
the major national issues of the economy, terror, immigration, and border control there were 
no gender differences. The national level issues on which women felt more threatened than 
men are all related to crime and again seem connected to women’s somewhat greater 
concerns with threats to physical safety and resources—online fraud, knife crime, burglary, 
hate crime, and crimes against women. The one issue on which men were more threatened 
than women is religious extremism. Table 2 shows similar patterns for perceptions of 
community and personal security threats: women and men identified fewer threats in general 
at these levels but differences remain in women being more likely to identify problems such 
as online fraud while men identified issues such as immigration, weak border control and 
religious extremism. The marginally greater number of community-level threats identified by 
men than women is consistent with their greater likelihood to define security in terms of an 
absence of threats to their community, but the differences in issues are in the range of 4 to 5 
percent rather than the gaps of 10 percent and above sometimes seen in perceptions of global 
and national level threats.
Table 2 about here
The absence of evidence that perceptions of issues related to national security, 
terrorism and war were consistently viewed differently as threats by men and women is 
noteworthy. Another absence of interest pertains to the relatively low perceptions of “crimes 
against women” as a security issue. Although Table 2 shows women tend to be more likely to 
regard such crimes as threats at all levels, only ten percent identified them as a national 
security issue, less than sixteen other issues. The focus groups also showed neither women 
nor men understanding domestic violence within a security narrative. As a form of insecurity 
which is both relatively common (as compared to terrorist attacks, for example), and that 
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disproportionally harms women84, this demonstrates, as FSS scholarship has argued, the 
extent to which security discourses reflect and constitute gendered power relations.85 Indeed, 
when talking about local level threats participants in the focus groups always located these 
crimes outside the home and as acts typically perpetrated by strangers. This provides 
interesting evidence that Young’s logic of masculinist protection—in which threats are 
primarily outside the household, which is protected by the male head—is a powerful idea, if 
not the reality in objective terms.86 Again, we cannot draw definitive conclusions without 
further exploration, but this illustrates well how an FSS perspective is useful not only for 
analysing what our data show, but what it does not show, and the gendered and racialized 
“silences” that surround security discourses.87 This in turn can support the generation of 
different public opinion research that can engage with these silences more effectively. 
How can we reconcile the finding that women identify more threats, particularly at the 
global level, with the qualitative evidence that they also appear to feel less threatened when 
discussing threat levels? A clue may lie in responses to perceived threats. Snedker finds that 
fear of crime among women stems from concern about a broader range of family members 
than fear among men.88 Beyond family, as well as the survey evidence on women being more 
likely to define security threats in terms of human resources and well-being, the focus groups 
we conducted indicated that women had a greater propensity to look at security and threat 
from different perspectives. For example, a group of middle-aged Hindu women participants 
identified a variety of threatened groups within society, including older people, parents, 
84 Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety and the Department of Justice, 
‘Stopping domestic abuse and violence in Northern Ireland: a seven year strategy,’ available 
at: (https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dhssps/stopping-domestic-
sexual-violence-ni.pdf) accessed 29 July 2019; Office for National Statistics, ‘Domestic 
abuse in England and Wales: year ending March 2018’, available at: 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/domestic
abuseinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2018) accessed 29 July 2019.
85 Sjoberg, ‘Feminist security and security studies.’
86 Young, ‘The logic of masculinist protection.’
87 Bertrand, ‘Can the subaltern securitize?’; Kronsell, ‘Method for studying silences.’
88 Snedker, ‘Altruistic and vicarious fear of crime.’
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British Asians and other non-white people. They identified racism as a major threat for them 
and their children, but suggested that others in Britain would not prioritise racism as a 
threat—as one of them put it, “I think we probably look at things in a slightly different way.” 
Similarly, a young white woman from Bristol explained: the ranking of different threats is 
difficult because “it is personal for each person, it’s different”; we did not identity such 
patterns in the discussions among men.89 It could be that this reflects a stronger group-based 
gender consciousness among women, which may arise in part from the gendered and 
intersectional microaggressions that women face on a day-to-day basis.90
 This section again demonstrates the utility of mixed methods informed by 
consideration of the insights offered by public opinion and FSS research. Gauging the 
number of issues identified as security threats in the survey showed us that women perceive 
more threats, particularly for everyday issues of crime at the national and global levels. But in 
looking beyond the apparent “gaps” themselves and analyzing discussions in the focus groups 
we suggest that they represent something different and more subtle than women simply being 
more threatened than men: that women are more able and more disposed to consider security 
threats from a range of different viewpoints beyond their own. This is also consistent with the 
survey evidence on women’s somewhat different emphases in definitions of “security threat”, 
showing how public opinion and FSS research can complement each other as well as 
highlight gaps and tensions in the extant research. 
iii. Government’s ability to deal with security threats
A key aspect of differences between men and women in our data is opinions of the 
extent to which these threats can be mitigated by government, which we argue tells us more 
89 It is also possible that there are other differences between women and men that account for 
these gender gaps in perceptions of threat which do not emerge clearly in small-N focus 
group discussion. We present some analysis and discussion of this evidence, using the survey 
data, in Online Appendix Table A4. It shows that gender differences in attitudinal and 
demographic variables appear not to be the explanation for the results shown in Table 2.
90 We thank Reviewer 1 for suggesting this as a possible explanation.
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about the political implications of threat perceptions than whether or not women favour an 
immediate belligerent response to military or terror threats. The focus groups showed that 
although respondents felt the responsibility for addressing the threats they identified was 
spread across society, the primary actor should be the government. We also observed 
frustration from men and women with the effectiveness of UK government policies in 
tackling, or potentially exacerbating, a range of threats, from terrorism—“Yes I mean if you 
feel really concerned about the terrorist threat I mean look at our foreign policies”—to anti-
social behaviour—“they should make a really strict law and show people, show that this is 
what happens and this punishment is for this person.”
The survey focused n a subset of 11 of the issues, including terrorism and identity 
theft, and looked at perceptions of the government’s ability to deal with security threats in a 
different way. Respondents were asked about the government’s present handling of each 
threat and then their expectations of the government’s success in handling the threat in the 
future on a scale from “very well” to “very badly”. This gives us an indication both of 
differences in current perceptions of government’s ability to deal with security threats and of 
optimism or pessimism about its ability to deal with those threats in the future—a gauge of 
likely effectiveness. Online Appendix Table A5 shows analysis of perceptions of the 
government’s current handling of the 11 threats. Differences between men and women are 
evident for 3 of the 11 issues, with two of those showing women judging the government 
more harshly than men: there are not systematic differences in perceptions.
Next, we turn to perceptions of the UK government’s ability to deal with the 11 
security threats in the future. Table 3 reports the results of regression analyses in which the 
dependent variables are the difference between respondents’ perceptions of future and current 
evaluations of handling of each threat. Positive scores indicate greater expectations of future 
government effectiveness than perceptions of current government effectiveness, zero 
indicates no difference, and negative scores that expectations of future government 
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effectiveness are lower than current government effectiveness (for further details see notes to 
Table 3). On all 11 issues there was a general “optimism bias” (see Online Appendix Table 
A6), or tendency to think that the government would handle the threat better in the future 
than currently, but the coefficients for gender in Table 3 show that being a woman had an 
additional statistically significant and positive effect on perceptions of future government 
effectiveness for nine of the eleven issues (including terrorism). When we control for other 
factors such as political efficacy and approval of the current government, in the second 
column of results for each issue in Table 3, the effects for women remain significant (at 
p<.10) for eight of the eleven issues.91 While these results are consistent with Gwartney’s92 
and Salvatore and Gorman’s93 findings regarding gender differences in optimism about the 
government’s effectiveness in tackling terrorism, we find these differences to be present 
almost regardless of the issue. This is despite the qualitative evidence that women are more 
likely to say of threats such as terrorism that there is little the government can do.94 
Table 3 about here
91 Based on previous research on influences on perceptions of security threats (e.g., Harold 
Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, Performance Politics and the 
British Voter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Karen Stenner, The 
Authoritarian Dynamic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)), we control for 
authoritarianism, age, overall satisfaction with the government, party identification, and 
political efficacy (internal and external). These are all coded on scales from 0 to 1 (see Online 
Appendix). Political efficacy pertains to perceptions that ordinary people have an influence 
on political decision-making, with the distinction between internal and external efficacy 
being whether an individual considers him or herself sufficiently cognizant and informed to 
participate in politics (internal efficacy) as opposed to the extent to thinking that government 
is responsive to the public in general (external efficacy).
92 Gwartney, ‘Race, gender, class and perceptions of terrorism.’
93 Salvatore and Gorman, ‘Gender-based perceptions of the 2001 anthrax attacks.’
94 Internal efficacy may offer a partial explanation for differences (see Online Appendix 
Table A4): we examined whether the influence of internal efficacy varied between men and 
women. We found statistically significant interactions for three of the eleven issues (at p<.10) 
that indicated no differences in perceptions of future government effectiveness between men 
and women with the highest internal efficacy but differences—with women being more 
positive—at lower levels of internal efficacy.
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This evidence suggests that women’s objections to military action are not based on a 
broad scepticism about government’s ability to handle security threats. In addition, optimism 
as a result of women being socialized to accept greater threat95, or from the subordinate role 
of women vis-à-vis their masculine protectors in which they cede critical distance from the 
decision-making autonomy within the authoritarian security state96, may be factors but 
neither fully solves the puzzle. Women’s greater optimism also appears connected to a 
combination of perceptions of vulnerability and the kinds of differences in the intensity with 
which threats are felt that the focus group data suggested. 
As further evidence on vulnerability, the survey asked about respondents’ confidence 
in themselves and in the government in the event of a terrorist attack. On both measures men 
displayed significantly more confidence than women, reflecting perceptions of 
invulnerability, but especially in their confidence that they as an individual would know what 
to do (see Online Appendix Table A7). For men there was little difference in their confidence 
in themselves and their confidence in government, whereas women displayed far more 
confidence in government than in themselves. As we have shown in Table 3, women were 
also more optimistic about the government’s likely effectiveness in dealing with terrorism in 
the future. This is another potential example of the logic of masculinist protection.97 Thus, 
perceptions of vulnerability98 seem to be part of the explanation for women’s greater 
optimism about the efficacy of government action.
Table 3 also suggests that the ways in which socialization affects perceptions of 
threats such as from crime may be more complex than currently allowed: women may judge 
other threats relative to those where we have seen they perceive most risk, such as online 
95 Gilchrist et al., ‘Women and the “fear of crime”’; Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace.
96 Young, ‘The logic of masculinist protection.’
97 Young, ‘The logic of masculinist protection.’
98 Jocelyn Hollander, ‘Vulnerability and dangerousness: the construction of gender through 
conversation about violence’, Gender & Society, 15:1 (2001); Snedker, ‘Altruistic and 
vicarious fear of crime.’
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crime. The everyday risk around threats like online crime appears to contribute to the 
pragmatism we observe about other threats, feeding into women’s optimism about future 
handling of those threats. We say this because identity theft and online crime were two of the 
most frequently raised security threats by women in the focus groups, and the survey data 
show that online crime was one of the issues that women were consistently more likely to 
identify as a security threat than men. Yet differences between men and women on the likely 
future ability of government to mitigate these threats are also least pronounced in Table 3. By 
contrast women were more optimistic about the future on issues they identified as threats in 
similar numbers to men, such as environmental issues, immigration, Islamophobia, and the 
Far Right. That identity theft and online crime were also issues about which women were 
most threatened suggests that there are not gender differences in perceptions of government’s 
future effectiveness on issues for which women feel similarly intensely threatened to men. 
Before concluding, we note that the gendered patterns we see in the qualitative 
and quantitative data seem to transcend religion, lifestage and region.99 For example, in 
the focus group discussion among Hindu women from which we quoted above, while the 
racism they mention may have been more salient to them than for the white woman from 
Bristol in the quote that followed, what was more striking than race was the tendency of 
these and other women to consider security threats from perspectives beyond their own. 
This was in contrast to men. The large-N survey data provide additional evidence. We 
looked at possible intersectionality of gender and age, religion and region of residence:  
none of this analysis indicated that any of these factors affected the relationships between 
gender and the dependent variables we examine.100 This is not to rule out any possibility 
99 Most groups were exclusively composed of men or women; five were of mixed sex but the 
same lifestage. Discussion of security threats in these mixed groups was consistent with 
discussion in homogeneous groups.
100 In quantitative terms, we examined whether the effects of gender in Tables 1-3 were 
moderated by age, religion (Muslim, non-Muslim), or region (Scotland, Wales, North, 
Midlands, South, London) but found no evidence that they were.
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of intersectionality: the absence of evidence could be due to our focus on descriptive 
characteristics of individuals such as age and region, and our limited ability to examine 
race, rather than, for example, Saar et al.’s examination of, “different social locations, 
different types of violence and different types of knowledge.”101 There may also be 
intersectional influences on perceptions of security that differ among women and among 
men; they are beyond the scope of this article but should be explored in future research.
Conclusion
Research on differences in perceptions of security threats between men and women 
consistently presents the puzzle that, while women and men do not occupy different political 
universes on these issues, men identify fewer threats but are more likely to favour aggressive 
responses to address those threats than women. Indeed, this article has replicated those kinds 
of findings in Britain in 2012. We could have searched for the “mechanisms” that might 
account for these gender differences. But in taking the novel step of bringing public opinion 
and FSS research into closer conversation our analysis demonstrates that this would be 
premature: what lies behind these apparent gaps in opinion is complex and first demands 
careful interpretation and scrutiny. 
For example, we have shown that gender differences on the issues of war and conflict 
that have dominated previous research are not those where there are the greatest differences, 
nor are they confined to issues characterized by physical threat. Instead, differences are most 
evident for perceptions of everyday issues such as crimes of various kinds. In addition, 
women’s “greater sense of threat” appears to come not simply from seeing more threats in 
their environment but from an ability or willingness to put themselves in the position of 
others that has not previously been recognized. Indeed, we have suggested that it is men who 
feel more threatened in terms of being in a constant state of alert and feeling threats more 
101 Sa’ar et al., ‘Between a gender and a feminist analysis’, p.66.
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intensely. Finally, women also appear to be more pragmatic and optimistic about what can be 
done by government to mitigate threats, but the evidence we have presented suggests that this 
is not simply due to greater risk aversion, nor because women have less confidence in 
themselves or are detached and uncritical of the masculinist protection of the state. The 
complex interplay of these factors needs much more investigation. 
These specific findings are from Britain in 2012. Their substantive implications 
clearly need further testing in other contexts. But it would be surprising, and interesting, if 
strong findings in our analysis such as women’s tendency to be optimistic about 
government’s ability to handle threats in the future were not evident in different contexts in 
Britain or in different countries. More importantly, there is a clear need for further research to 
explore the underlying explanations for these differences in much greater depth. These 
explanations are likely to be contextual and mediated by a range of individual and community 
factors—and therefore not necessarily g neralizable in a straightforward way. But as the 
engagement with FSS perspectives has shown, there is a real need for more sophisticated 
explorations of any “gender gaps” we might identify.
Indeed, our broader argument is about the methodological implications of our 
research. Future research requires a move towards the methodological pluralism we have 
employed, which can identify complex relationships and factors whilst maintaining a critical 
perspective that is sensitive to gendered power relations and knowledge constructs. This 
approach would embrace potential ontological and epistemological tensions between the 
different methodologies reflected in public opinion and FSS research to-date in order to 
identify and understand “variable relationships of co-constitution, signification and 
performativity” and generate opportunities for creative dialogue across disciplinary and 
methodological borders.102 It would interrogate the ways in which security discourses—and 
ideas about masculinity and femininity—constitute, rather than simply represent, security 
102 Barkin and Sjoberg, ‘Calculating critique,’ p.868.
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realities for different people by paying attention to the relationship between security and 
identity (Stern 2005).103 Most immediately this article’s findings suggest that further research 
is needed to better understand how men think about aggression and their masculinity, why 
they appear to feel more threatened, and what rationalities make possible their privileging of 
aggressive responses. 
This research should also include a consideration of the influence of other potential 
factors we have been unable to consider in this article, such as race and a stronger group-
based consciousness among women. Research in the UK and US has also demonstrated an 
influence of newspapers and television on perceptions of security threats.104 But questions of 
their relationship to differences in media consumption among women and men, or to 
differences in the processing of media messages, have not been explored. This should go 
beyond perceptions of security threats to look at media influence on the kinds of differences 
in fearfulness and pragmatism that we have indicated in our analysis. Further research will 
also enable us to understand more fully how effective securitizing discourses are105, and how 
gendered power relations shape this process.106 Finally, returning to Enloe’s maxim that “the 
personal is international”, we need to find out what determines how people identify threats as 
local, national and global, why they exclude other vulnerabilities, and what the relationships 
are between security at the local, national and global levels. 
Engaging with FSS approaches could enrich and transform public opinion accounts of 
the differences between men and women’s perceptions of security. By the same token, 
103 Maria Stern, Naming Security- Constructing Identity: “Mayan Women” in Guatemala on 
the Eve of “Peace” (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
104 e.g., Dan Cassino, Dan, Fox News and American Politics: How One Channel Shapes 
American Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 2016); Shah Nister Kabir, Sharifah Nurul 
Huda Alkaff, and Michael Bourk, ‘Iconizing “Muslim terrorism” in a British newspaper and 
public perception’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 38:2 (2018); Stevens and Vaughan-
Williams, Everyday Security Threats.
105 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
106 Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma.’
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engaging with public opinion methodologies would allow FSS to examine the interconnected 
relationships between different threats that it often postulates but tends to eschew testing. We 
advocate a research agenda in international security studies that systematically and 
comprehensively engages both literatures and utilizes their methodological expertise. This 
would allow us to go beyond the gender-gap stalemate in which we reproduce findings but 
get no closer to explaining them, and instead generate sophisticated knowledge about the 
relationship between men and women’s perceptions of security and the security discourses 
that constitute those opinions and lived experiences.
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Table 1: Definitions of “Security”
First Mention Any Mention
Women (%) Men (%) Women (%) Men (%)
Feeling physically safe where you are 
(where you live, work etc.)
50* 39 81* 73
The absence of threats to humans in a 
general sense
14 15 54* 47
The absence of threats to me (i.e., 
individuals)
8 11* 38 43*
The ability to access health care, 
education, and sufficient resources 
necessary for human well-being 
8 8 31* 25
The freedom to do what you want 
within the confines of the law
7 8 27 28
The absence of threats to my 
community
3 4 23 30*
The nation’s freedom from foreign 
dictation
2 6* 14 21*
It depends. Some people’s security 
depends on other people’s 
insecurity
4 4 14 13
Being treated the way others are 
treated
1 1 8 7
The threat, use, or control of military 
force
2 2 6 7
* (and shaded boxes). Difference statistically significant at p<.05 (chi-square test)
Source: ICM Survey, Security in an Age of Austerity, June 6-15 2012
Notes: Figures are from the question, “Which one of the following best describes what you understand by the term 
‘security’?  And which next best describes what you understand? And next?” Respondents could choose up to three 
definitions, or one or two if they preferred.
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Table 2: Differences in Issues Perceived as Security Threats by Women and Men 
(numbers are %)
Women more threatened than men* Women less threatened than men*
Global level 
Online fraud/identity theft
Knife crime 
Racial or religious hate crime
Crimes against women
Burglary
Terrorism
Religious extremism
Nuclear accident
Economy
Environmental issues 
37-23
34-21
47-35
23-11
21-13
72-65
59-52
30-23
48-43
32-27
+14
+13
+12
+12
+8
+7
+7
+7
+5
+5
National level
Knife crime
Online fraud/identity theft
Racial or religious hate crime
Crimes against women
Burglary
29-18
23-13
31-22
10-4
11-8
+11
+10
+9
+6
+3
Religious extremism 32-39 -7
Community level
Burglary 
Online fraud/identity theft 
Crimes against women 
31-26
18-13
11-7
+5
+5
+4
Religious extremism
Weak border control
Resource scarcity 
Terrorism
Nuclear weapons
7-13
4-8
5-9
6-9
1-3
-6
-4
-4
-3
-2
Personal level
Online fraud/identity theft 
Crimes against women 
Health pandemic 
24-19
9-4
10-7
+5
+5
+3
Religious extremism
Weak border control
Immigration 
6-10
3-6
9-12
-4
-3
-3
Source: ICM Survey, Security in an Age of Austerity, June 6-15 2012.
*Issues listed show statistically significant differences between women and men at p<.05 in chi-squared tests. 
Notes: Figures are from the questions, “Which, if any, of the following issues do you personally consider to be 
serious threats to the security of the world/ UK/ community in which you live/ you and your family at the 
moment?”
Figures show the differences between women and men in the third column, with the second column showing 
% identifying each issue as a threat, with women first and men second, e.g., (24-19) means 24% of women and 
19% of men.
Issues not shown imply a statistically insignificant difference. (For a full list of the issues from which 
respondents could choose, see Online Appendix Table A3.) 
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Table 3: Perceptions of Government Effectiveness in Handling Threats in the Future
Financial crisis Crime Cybercrime Identity theft Terrorism Religious extremism
Woman .27 (.05)* .20 (.05)* .23 (.05)* .19 (.05)* .07 (.05) .05 (.05) .07 (.05) .04 (.05) .09 (.04)* .06 (.04) .16 (.05)* .15 (.05)*
Authoritarianism .26 (.08)* .19 (.07)* .16 (.07)* .25 (.07)* .18 (.07)* .32 (.08)*
Internal efficacy -.26 (.12)* -.23 (.11)* -.15 (.12) -.16 (.12) -.17 (.10)# .03 (.13)
External efficacy .23 (.13)# .00 (.12) .22 (.12)# .13 (.12) .05 (.11) -.09 (.14)
Approval of 
current govt.
-.49 (.10)* -.07 (.09) .15 (.09) .17 (.09)# .24 (.08)* .14 (.10)
Age -.67 (.11)* -.42 (.10)* -.41 (.10)* -.40 (.10)* -.36 (.09)* -.25 (.11)*
Conservative id .01 (.07) -.09 (.07) -.01 (.07) .00 (.07) -.06 (.06) -.12 (.08)
Labour id .10 (06) -.05 (.06) .06 (.06) .04 (.06) .03 (.05) -.10 (.06)
No party id .06 (.09) -.06 (.08) -.04 (.08) -.01 (.08) -.03 (.07) -.13 (.09)
Constant .46 (.04)* .79 (.13)* .19 (.03)* .48 (.12)* .21 (.03)* .24 (.12)* .27 (.03)* .26 (.12)* -.04 (.03) .03 (.11) .25 (.04)* .23 (.13)#
N 1712 1712 1717 1717 1536 1536 1572 1572 1675 1675 1610 1610
Adjusted R2 .02 .06 .01 .03 .00 .02 .00 .02 .00 .02 .01 .02
Immigration Islamophobia Far Right Climate change Global warming
Woman .18 (.06)* .15 (.06)* .13 (.05)* .10 (.05)# .13 (.05)* .11 (.05)* .13 (.05)* .11 (.05)* .12 (.05)* .08 (.05)#
Authoritarianism .48 (.09)* .25 (.08)* .17 (.07)* .14 (.07)* .15 (.08)#
Internal efficacy -.31 (.14)* -.18 (.13) -.08 (.12) -.04 (.11) -.20 (.12)
External efficacy .07 (.15) -.10 (.14) .23 (.12)# .33 (.12)* .14 (.13)
Approval of 
current govt.
.20 (.11)# .16 (.10) .11 (.09) -.05 (.09) .08 (.10)
Age -.08 (.12) -.37 (.11)* -.31 (.10)* -.59 (.10)* -.33 (.11)*
Conservative id .10 (.08) .04 (.08) .04 (.07) -.12 (.07)# -.03 (.07)
Labour id -.07 (.07) .09 (.06) .08 (.06) -.11 (.06)# .04 (.06)
No party id -.04 (.10) -.00 (.09) .01 (.09) -.08 (.08) -.05 (08)
Constant .50 (.04)* .35 (.14)* .16 (.04)* .23 (.13)# .15 (.03)* .07 (.12) .15 (.03)* .31 (.12)* .19 (.03)* .28 (.12)*
N 1707 1707 1418 1418 1442 1442 1593 1593 1566 1566
Adjusted R2 .01 .03 .00 .02 .00 .02 .00 .03 .00 .01
* p<.05 (two-tailed test); Estimates are from OLS regression models
Source: ICM Survey, Security in an Age of Austerity, June 6-15 2012. 
Notes: For each issue the scale is from +4 implying the most optimism (the government is handling the threat “very badly” (1) now but will handle it “very well” (5) in the future) to 
-4, (the government will handle the threat “very badly” (1) in the future compared to “very well” now (5)). All other variables are coded on a 0 to 1 scale (see Online Appendix). 
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